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Abstract
Providing security for wireless sensor networks in hostile environments has a
significant importance. Resilience against malicious attacks during the process of
location discovery has an increasing need. There are many applications that rely on
sensor nodes' locations to be accurate in order to function correctly. The need to provide
secure, attack resistant location discovery schemes has become a challenging research
topic. In this thesis, location discovery techniques are discussed and the security threats
and attacks are explained. I also present current secure location discovery schemes which
are developed for range-based location discovery.
The thesis goal is to develop a secure range-free location discovery scheme. This is
accomplished by enhancing the voting-based scheme developed in [8, 9] to be used as the
bases for developing a secure range-free location discovery scheme. Both the
enhancement voting-based and the secure range-free schemes are implemented on Sun
SPOT wireless sensors and subjected to various levels of location discovery attacks and
tested under different sensor network scales using a simulation program developed for
testing purposes.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are networks made of small, battery-powered,
memory-constrained devices called sensor nodes, which have the capability of wireless
communication over a restricted area. Due to memory and power constraints, they need
to be well-arranged to build a fully functional network. Wireless sensors' locations are
vital to many sensor network applications such as environmental monitoring, military
applications, and many other applications which require sensors' location information to
fulfill their tasks. There are also several fundamental techniques [8] developed for
wireless sensor networks which require wireless sensor nodes' locations, for instance
geographic routing protocols where sensor nodes make routing decisions based on their
own location as well as their neighbors' locations.
Despite recent advances, location discovery for wireless sensor networks in hostile
environments has been typically overlooked. Most of the existing location discovery
protocols are vulnerable in the presence of malicious attacks. An attacker may provide
incorrect location references by replaying the beacon packets intercepted in different
locations. Furthermore, an attacker may compromise a beacon node and distribute
malicious location references by lying about the beacon node’s location or manipulating
the beacon signals. In either of these cases, non-beacon nodes will determine their
locations incorrectly. The security of location discovery can certainly be enhanced by
authentication. However, authentication does not guarantee the security of location
discovery. An attacker may forge beacon packets with keys learned through
compromised nodes, or replay beacon signals intercepted in different locations [8].
Several attack-resistant location estimation techniques were developed to tolerate
the malicious attacks against range-based location discovery in wireless sensor networks.
This thesis focuses on the voting-based location estimation technique developed in [8, 9],
where the deployment field is quantized into a grid of cells and has each location
reference vote on the cells in which the node may reside with iterative refinement of the
voting results so that it can be executed in resource constrained sensor nodes.
The thesis work provides enhancement over the voting-based location discovery
estimation to simplify it further and make it adaptable for use in range-free schemes. The
enhanced voting-based technique would be applied to develop a secure range-free
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location discovery scheme. This would provide a less complicated, cost-effective, and
more applicable solution for wireless sensor networks.

1.1 Classification of Localization Techniques
1.1.1

Direct approaches

This is also known as absolute localization. The direct approach itself can be classified
into two types: Manual configuration and GPS-based localization. The manual
configuration method is very cumbersome and expensive. It is neither practical nor
scalable for large scale WSNs and in particular, does not adapt well for WSNs with node
mobility. On the other hand, in the GPS-based localization method, each sensor is
equipped with a GPS receiver. This method adapts well for WSNs with node mobility.
However, there is a downside to this method. It is not economically feasible to
equip each sensor with a GPS receiver since WSNs are deployed with hundreds of
thousands of sensors. This increases the size of each sensor, rendering them unfit for
pervasive environments. Also, the GPS receivers only work well outdoors on earth and
have line-of-sight requirement constraints. Such WSNs cannot be used for underwater
applications like habitat monitoring, water pollution level monitoring, and tsunami
monitoring [1].
1.1.2

Indirect approaches

The indirect approach of localization is also known as relative localization since nodes
position themselves relative to other nodes in their vicinity. The indirect approaches of
localization were introduced to overcome some of the drawbacks of the GPS-based direct
localization techniques while retaining some of their advantages, like accuracy of
localization. In this approach, a small subset of nodes in the network, called the beacon
nodes, are either equipped with GPS receivers to compute their location or are manually
configured with their location. These beacon nodes then send beams of signals providing
their location to all sensor nodes in their vicinity that do not have a GPS receiver. Using
the transmitted signal containing the location information, sensor nodes compute their
location. This approach effectively reduces the overhead introduced by the GPS-based
method [1].
However, since the beacon nodes are also operating in the same hostile environment
as the sensor nodes, they too are vulnerable to various threats, including physical capture
by adversaries. This introduces new security threats concerning the honesty of the beacon
nodes in providing location information since they could have been tampered with by the
adversary and misbehaves by providing incorrect location information [1].
2

Within the indirect approach, the localization process can be classified into the
following two categories:
Range-based:
In range-based localization, the location of a node is computed relative to other nodes in
its vicinity. Range-based localization depends on the assumption that the absolute
distance between a sender and a receiver can be estimated by one or more features of the
communication signal from the sender to the receiver. The accuracy of such estimation,
however, is subject to the transmission medium and surrounding environment. Range
based techniques usually rely on complex hardware which is not feasible for WSNs since
sensor nodes are highly resource-constrained and have to be produced at throw-away
prices as they are deployed in large numbers. The features of the communication signal
that are frequently used in literature for range-based localization are as follows:
•
•

•

•

Angle of Arrival (AoA): Range information is obtained by estimating and
mapping relative angles between neighbors.
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI): Use a theoretical or empirical model
to translate signal strength into distance. RADAR [1, 11] is one of the first to
make use of RSSI.
Time of Arrival (ToA): To obtain range information using ToA, the signal
propagation time from source to destination is measured. A GPS is the most basic
example that uses ToA. To use ToA for range estimation, a system needs to be
synchronous, which necessitates the use of expensive hardware for precise clock
synchronization with the satellite.
Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA): To obtain the range information using
TDoA, an ultrasound is used to estimate the distance between the node and the
source. Like ToA, TDoA necessitates the use of special hardware, rendering it too
expensive for WSNs.

Range-free:
Range-free localization never tries to estimate the absolute point to point distance based
on received signal strength or other features of the received communication signal like
time, angle, etc. This greatly simplifies the design of hardware, making range-free
methods very appealing and a cost-effective alternative for localization in WSNs.
Amorphous localization [12], Centroid localization [10], APIT [18], DV-Hop localization
[3], SeRLoc [5] are some examples of range-free localization techniques [1].
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1.2 Security Threats Associated with Location Discovery
In hostile environments, an adversary can compromise sensor nodes location discovery
via injecting misleading location references. The attacker can either be an insider or an
outsider. As an insider, the attacker has access to all of the cryptographic keying
keyi material
held by a node. This is potentially dangerous since the attacker can now claim to be a
legitimate part of the network. Authentication or verification via password and other
mechanisms give up under this attack model. On the other hand, in the ooutsider
utsider attack
model, the attacker is outside the network and has no information about cryptographic
keys and passwords necessary for authentication. The attacker can only capture a node
but cannot extract the sensitive information. This model is comparatively
comparati
less
detrimental, but harmful nonetheless. So, for localization process to be secured it has to
be robust in its defense against both outsider and insider attacks [1].

Figure 1.1: Attack patterns against location discovery schemes [1, 8].
Some attacks
cks that have been discussed for nearly a decade in literature that are the
most common against localization schemes are as follows:
•

Masquerading and Compromising Beacon Nodes: In masquerading, the
attacker would impersonate a beacon node and send misleadi
misleading
ng information about
its location to divert the other benign nodes from discovering their accurate
location, as shown in Figure 1.1(a).
(a). An attacker can also compromise beacon
nodes through physical capture, and use the compromised beacon nodes to inject
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misleading location references that would affect location discovery for other
benign nodes, as shown in Figure 1.1(b) [8].
•

Replay Attack: A replay attack is the easiest and most commonly used by
attackers. Specifically, when an attacker’s capability is limited, i.e., the attacker
cannot compromise more than 1 node; this is the most preferred attack. In a replay
attack, the attacker merely jams the transmission between a sender and a receiver
and later replays the same message, posing as the sender. The other way to launch
a replay attack is, as shown in Figure 1.1(c). A replay attack has a two-fold
consequence. First, the attacker is replaying the message of another node. Second,
the attacker is transmitting stale information. In particular, the chances of the
information being stale are higher in networks with higher node mobility. When
replay attacks are launched on the localization process, a localizing node will
receive an incorrect reference thereby localizing incorrectly. Unlike a wormhole
attack, a single node can disrupt the network with a replay attack [1, 8].

•

Sybil Attack: The Sybil attack requires a more sophisticated attacker compared
to the replay attack. In a Sybil attack, a node claims multiple identities in the
network. When launched on localization, localizing nodes can receive multiple
location references from a single node leading to incorrect location estimation.
Like the replay attack, the Sybil attack can also be launched by a single node
since there is no need for collusion among nodes to launch this attack [1].

•

Wormhole Attack: A wormhole attack is the most complicated of all the
mentioned attacks. To launch a wormhole attack, the attacker has to compromise
at least two nodes. In The colluding nodes in the network, tunnel messages are
transmitted in one part of the network to their colluding partners in other parts of
the network. The effect of a wormhole attack on localization is depicted in Figure
1.1(d). Here, node A is sending its reference to nodes B and C. However, since
there is a wormhole link between C and G, G can locally replay the location
reference of A in its neighborhood, misleading node F. Consequently, F will
compute its location incorrectly. Intuitively, wormhole attacks pose more serious
problems in range-free localization compared to range-based localization [1].
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Chapter 2
EXISTING SECURE LOCATION DISCOVERY SCHEMES

Several techniques have been developed to deal with the security problems of
location discovery in wireless sensor networks. The location verification technique
proposed in Secure Verification of Location Claims [14] can be used to verify the relative
distance between a verifying node and a sensor node. However, it does not provide a
solution to conduct secure location estimation at non-beacon nodes. A robust location
detection is developed in Robust Location Detection [13] using the idea of majority
voting, but it cannot be directly applied in resource constrained sensor networks due to its
high computation and storage overheads. A robust statistical method is independently
discovered in Robust Statistical Method [7] to achieve robustness through Least Median
of Squares.
SeRLoc [5] protects location discovery with the help of sectored antennae at beacon
nodes. Similar to the voting-based scheme, SeRLoc can tolerate malicious attacks by
adopting the idea of majority voting. SPINE [2] was developed to protect location
discovery by using verifiable multi-lateration. However, the distance bounding
techniques required for verifiable multi-lateration may not be available in sensor
networks due to the difficulties in dealing with the external attacks in ultrasound-based
distance bounding and achieving nanosecond processing and time measurements in radiobased distance bounding. ROPE [6] is developed by integrating SeRLoc and SPINE.
However, it still requires nanosecond processing and time measurements that are not
desirable for the current generation of sensor networks.
MMSE [8, 9] is a recently developed scheme that deals with malicious attacks
against location discovery using statistical approach, where minimum mean square is
used as an indicator to identify and remove the inconsistent malicious location references.
In [8, 9], they have also developed a secure discovery scheme that adopts an iteratively
refined voting scheme to tolerate malicious location references introduced by attackers.
Both statistical and voting based approaches are purely based on a range based location
discovery scheme, where the location references may come from beacon nodes that are
either single hop or multiple hops away, or from those non-beacon nodes that already
estimated their location [9]. In this thesis, the work will be focused on voting based
location discovery scheme.
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2.1 Statistical Based Location Discovery Scheme:
Intuitively, a location reference introduced by a malicious attack is aimed at misleading a
sensor node about its location. Thus, it is usually different from benign location
references. When there are redundant location references, there must be some
inconsistency between the malicious location references and the benign ones (an attacker
may still have a location reference consistent with the benign ones after changing both
the location and the distance values. However, such a location reference will not generate
significantly negative impact on location determination). To take advantage of this
observation, the inconsistency among the location references are used to identify the
malicious ones, and discard them before finally estimating the locations at sensor nodes
[9].
In a statistical based scheme, the sensor node uses a Minimum Mean Square Error
(MMSE) based method to estimate its own location. Thus, most current range-based
localization methods can be used with this technique. To harness this observation, the
sensor’s location is first estimated with the MMSE-based method and then assessed if the
estimated location could be derived from a set of consistent location references. If so, the
estimation result is accepted; otherwise, the most inconsistent location references are
identified and removed, and the same process is repeated. This process may continue
until a set of consistent location references is found or it is not possible to find such a set
[9].
2.1.1. Checking the consistency of location references
The mean square error ς2 of the distance measurements based on the estimated location is
used as an indicator of the degree of inconsistency, since all the MMSE-based methods
estimate a sensor node’s location by (approximately) minimizing this mean square error
[9].
Definition 1: Given a set of location references    ,  ,  ,  ,  , , ,
 ,  ,
 and a location ,  estimated based on L, the mean square error of this
location estimation is:
 






          



2.1

Intuitively, the more inconsistent a set of location references is, the greater the
corresponding mean square error should be. A simple, threshold-based method is used to
determine if a set of location references obtained at a sensor node is τ-consistent with
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respect to a MMSE-based method if the method gives an estimated location ,  such
that the mean square error of this location estimation is [9]:
 






          
!"



2.2

2.1.2. Identifying the largest consistent set
Since the MMSE-based methods can deal with measurement errors better if there are
more benign location references, as many benign location references should be kept as
possible while the malicious ones are removed. This implies the largest set of consistent
location references should be achieved.
Brute-force Algorithm (BARMMSE): Given a set L of n location references and a
threshold τ, a simple approach to computing the largest set of τ-consistent location
references is to check all subsets of L with i location references about τ-consistency,
where i starts from n and drops until a subset of L is found to be τ-consistent or it is not
possible to find such a set. Thus, if the largest set of consistent location references
consists of m elements, a sensor node has to use the MMSE method at least 1 
$
$
#
%   # % times to find the right one. If n = 10 and m = 5, a node needs to
1
$
perform the MMSE method for at least 387 times. It is certainly not desirable to do such
expensive operations on resource constrained sensor nodes [9].
Greedy Algorithm (GARMMSE): To reduce the computation on sensor nodes, a greedy
algorithm can be used, which is simple but suboptimal. This greedy algorithm works in
rounds. It starts with the set of all location references in the first round. In each round, it
first verifies if the current set of location references is τ-consistent. If so, the algorithm
outputs the estimated location and stops. Optionally, it may also output the set of location
references. Otherwise, it considers all subsets of location references with one fewer
location reference, and chooses the subset with the least mean square error as the input to
the next round. This algorithm continues until it finds a set of τ-consistent location
references or when it is not possible to find such a set (i.e., there are only three remaining
location references) [9].
The greedy algorithm significantly reduces the computational overhead in sensor
nodes. To continue the earlier example, a sensor node only needs to perform MMSE
operations about 50 times (instead of 387 times) using this algorithm. In general, a sensor
node needs to use a MMSE-based method for at most 1  $  $  1   4  1 
8

'()'*+


times. However, the greedy algorithm cannot guarantee that it can always
identify the largest consistent set. It is possible that benign location references are
removed, which generates a big impact on the accuracy of location estimation, especially
when there are multiple malicious location references. To deal with this problem, an
enhanced greedy algorithm was developed based on an efficient approach to identify the
most suspicious location reference from a set of location references [9].
Enhanced Greedy Algorithm (EARMMSE): In the previous discussion, only the
consistency of 3 or more location references was considered. A further investigation also
reveals that two benign location references are usually consistent with each other such
that there exists at least one location in the deployment field on which both location
references agree. Hence, when the majority of location references are benign, many
location references can usually be found so that they are consistent with a benign location
reference. In addition, when a malicious location reference tries to create a larger location
error, the number of location references that are consistent with the malicious one will
decrease quickly [9].
According to the above discussion, for each location reference the number of
location references that are consistent with this location reference can simply be counted.
This number is called the degree of consistency and can be used to rank the
suspiciousness of the location references received at a particular non-beacon node. The
smaller the degree is, the more likely that the corresponding location reference is
malicious [9].
The consistency between two location references can be verified as follows. For any
location reference , , , the non-beacon node derives the area that it may reside based
on this location reference. This area can be represented by a ring centered at (x, y), with
the inner radius max {δ- ,, 0} and the outer radius (δ+ ,), where , is the maximum
distance error. For the sake of presentation, such a ring is referred to as the candidate ring
(centered) at location (x, y). The non-beacon node then checks whether the candidate
rings of two location references overlap each other. If the candidate rings overlap, they
are consistent; otherwise, they are not consistent [9].
The algorithm to check whether the candidate rings of two location references,
-  . , . , . and /  0 , 0 , 0 , overlap can be done efficiently in the following
way: Let dab denote the distance between (xa, ya) and (xb, yb) and let rmax(x) and rmin(x)
denote the outer radius and the inner radius of the candidate ring of location reference x,
respectively. We can easily figure out that the candidate rings of location references a
and b will not overlap when any of the following three conditions are true:
(1) dab > rmax(a) + rmax(b),
9

(2) dab + rmax(a) < rmin(b) and
(3) dab + rmax(b) < rmin(a).
Similar to the greedy algorithm, the enhanced algorithm has to identify the largest
consistent set starting with the set of all location references in the first round. In each
round, it verifies whether the current set of location references is τ-consistent. If the
current set is τ-consistent, the algorithm outputs the estimated location and stops.
Optionally, it may also output the set of location references. Otherwise, the algorithm
removes the location reference corresponding to the smallest degree and uses the
remaining location references as the input to the next round. This algorithm continues
until it finds a set of τ-consistent location references or when it is not possible to find
such a set (i.e., there are only three remaining location references) [9].
The enhanced algorithm not only improves the accuracy of location estimation in
the presence of malicious attacks, but also reduces the computation overhead
significantly since it can identify the most suspicious location reference efficiently and
effectively. To continue the earlier example, a non-beacon node only needs to perform
MMSE operations five times. In general, a non-beacon node needs to use a MMSE-based
method, at most, n-3 times [9].

2.2 Voting Based Scheme
In this approach, each location reference votes on the locations at which the node of
concern may reside. To facilitate the voting process, the target field is quantized into a
grid of cells, and each sensor node determines how likely it is in each cell based on each
location reference. The cell(s) with the highest vote is selected and the center of the
cell(s) used as the estimated location. To deal with the resource constraints on sensor
nodes, an iterative refinement scheme is developed to reduce the storage overhead,
improve the accuracy of estimation, and make the voting scheme efficient on resource
constrained sensor nodes [9].
2.2.1. The basic scheme
After collecting a set of location references, a sensor node determines the target field. The
node does so by first identifying the minimum rectangle that covers all the locations
declared in the location references, and then extending this rectangle by Rb, where Rb is
the maximum transmission range of a beacon signal. This extended rectangle forms the
target field, which contains all possible locations for the sensor node. The sensor node
then divides this rectangle into M small squares (cells) with the same side length L, as

10

illustrated in Figure 2.1.. (The node may further extend the target field to have square
cells.) The node then keeps a voting state variable for each cell, initially set to 0.

Figure 22.1: The voting based location estimation [9].
At the beginning of this algorithm, the non
non-beacon
beacon node needs to identify the
candidate ring of each location reference. For example, in Figure 2.1,, the ring centered at
point A is a candidate ring at A, which is derived from the location reference with the
declared location at A. For each location reference
, the sensor node identifies the
cells that overlap with the corresponding candidate ring and in
increments
crements the voting
variables for these cells by 1. After the node processes all the location references, it
chooses the cell(s) with the highest vote, and uses its
its’ (their) geometric centroid as the
estimated location of the sensor node [9].
2.2.2. Iterative refinement
The number of cells M (or equivalently, the quantization step L) is a critical parameter for
the voting-based
based algorithm. It has several implications to the performance of this
approach. First, the larger M is, the more state variables a sensor node has to keep, and
thus the more storage required. Second, the value of M (or L)) determines the precision of
location estimation. The larger M is, the smaller each cell will be. As a result, a sensor
node can determine its location more precise
precisely
ly based on the overlap of the cells and the
candidate rings [9].
However, due to the resource constraints on sensor nodes, the granularity of the
partition is usually limited by the memory available for the voting state variables on the
nodes. This puts a hard limit on the accuracy of location estimation. To address this
problem, an iterative refinement is proposed to the above basic algorithm to achieve fine
accuracy with reduced storage overhead. In this version, the number of cells M is chosen
according to the memory constraint in a sensor node. After the first round of the
11

algorithm, the node may find one or more cells having the largest vote. To improve the
accuracy of location estimation, the sensor node then identifies the smallest rectangle that
contains all the cells having the largest vote, and performs the voting process again. For
example, in Figure 2.1, the same algorithm will be performed in a rectangle which
exactly includes the four cells having three votes [9].
By having a smaller rectangle to quantize in a later iteration, the size of cells can be
reduced, resulting in a higher precision. Moreover, a malicious location reference will
most likely be discarded, since its candidate ring usually does not overlap with those
derived from benign location references. For example, in Figure 2.1, the candidate ring
centered at point D will not be used in the second iteration [9].
The iterative refinement process should terminate when a desired precision is
reached or the estimation cannot be refined. The former condition can be tested by
checking if the side length L of each cell is less than a predefined threshold S, while the
latter condition can be determined by checking whether L remains the same in two
consecutive iterations. The algorithm then stops and outputs the estimated location
obtained in the last iteration. It is easy to see that the algorithm will fall into either of
these two cases, and thus will always terminate [9].
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Chapter 3
PROPOSED SECURE LOCATION DISCOVERY SCHEMES

The main focus of this thesis work was focused on the voting-based scheme developed in
[8, 9], because it is more adaptive to be implemented on range-free location discovery
schemes, whereas the statistical MMSE scheme developed in [8, 9] can only work on
range-based location discovery schemes. The work took two phases, first phase was to
enhance voting-based location discovery scheme to be more applicable on wireless
sensors without the usage of distance measurements, such as ToA or RSSI. The second
phase was to develop a secure range-free location discovery scheme inspired by the
enhanced voting-based technique.

3.1 Enhanced Voting Based Scheme
In sensor networks and other distributed systems, errors can often be masked through
fault tolerance, redundancy, aggregation, or by other means. Depending on the behavior
and requirements of protocols using location information, varying granularities of error
maybe appropriate from system to system. Acknowledging that the cost of the hardware
required by range-based solutions maybe inappropriate in relation to the required location
precision, researchers have sought alternative range-free solutions to the location
discovery problem in sensor networks. These range-free solutions use only regular radio
modules as basics for location discovery; hence, they do not incur any additional
hardware cost [18].
This argument gives inspiration to use other means to measure the distance between
the sensor node and its location references without the need for the hardware associated
with distance measurement, such as RSSI or ToA. In homogeneous wireless sensor
networks, where all sensor nodes have common radio coverage range, a good distance
measure would be the combination of radio range and the number of hop counts between
the sensor and the location references sources. The distance can be estimated as the
product of the radio coverage range of the sensor node by the number of hop counts
between the sensor node and the location reference source, as shown in Figure 3.1.

13

Figure 3.1: Enhanced Voting-Based Scheme.
The sensor A receives three location references from sensors: U, V and W which
are approximately one, three and two hops away from sensor A
A,, respectively.
respectively Sensor A
would perform the enhanced voting based location discovery to estimate its location at
point p′.
The enhanced voting-based
based location discovery scheme can be initiated at the sensor
node once it receives enough location references to estimate its location. In practice,
receiving a minimum of three location references by a sensor node enables it to trigger a
location discovery process. The location references would be used to get the extent of the
deployment map for that sensor
sensor,, so that it contains all the location references received by
the sensor node. Then the deployment map is quantized into smal
smalll square cells,
cells where the
sensor node would initialize the voting state of those cells to zero.
The voting process starts by identifying the candidate rings for each location
reference.. The candidate rings for a location reference consist of two rings, an inner ring
with radius of Max[radio
radio range × (hop count − 1), 0],, and an outer ring of radius (radio
range × hop count). The second step in the voting process is to mark the cells that overlap
with the corresponding candidate rings of each location reference and increment their
vote by 1. Checking the overlap of candidate rings and cells for a given location reference
is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Overlapping of candidate rings and a cell.
With the intention of checking to see if a given cell, such as cell a,, overlaps with the
candidate rings of reference point P, let da1(P), da2(P), da3(P) and da4(P) denote the
distances between point P and the vertices of cell a,, respectively. The candidate rings
overlap with cell a if and only if the distance between point P and any of the cell a
vertices fall between the candidate rings of point P:
Where:
Rinner is the inner candidate ring for location reference point P.
Router is the outer candidate ring for location reference point P.
dai(P) is the distance between point P and vertex i of cell a.
After the node processes all the location references, it selects the cells with highest
vote and uses their geometrical centroid as the estimated location of the sensor node. The
enhanced voting based scheme also supports iterative refinement as in the original
scheme presented in [8, 9]. The cells with maxim
maximum
um vote will be quantized further into
smaller cells and fed back into the voting process algorithm again to refine the estimated
location results.
The enhanced voting based location discovery scheme can be summarized in the
following pseudo code:
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− Receive location references {(X1, Y1, Hops1), (X2, Y2, Hops2), ...};
− Determine the extents of deployment field:
− Lower left corner = min. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the location
reference;
− Upper right corner = max. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the
location reference;
− Quantize the deployment field into small square cells;
− For each cell in quantized deployment field, initialize the voting value to 0;
− For each location reference (Xi, Yi, Hopsi) {
o set innerRing radius = min[0, radioRange×(hopsi-1)]
o set outerRing radius = radioRange × hopsi
o for each cell in quantized deployment field {
 if (distance (any cell vertex, (Xi, Yi)) >= innerRing && <= outerRing)
increment cell vote by 1;
}
}
− highVoteCells = Get the set of cells with highest vote;
− estimatedLocation = Compute the geometrical centroid of highVoteCells;
− return estimatedLocation;

3.2 Secure Range-Free Location Discovery Scheme
Most of the security schemes presented so far focused on range-based location discovery
schemes. The main thesis goal is to develop a secure range-free location discovery
scheme inspired by voting-based scheme. The enhanced voting-based scheme will be
applied to APIT [18] which is a range-free location discovery scheme, but does not have
consideration of resilience against location discovery attacks.
3.2.1

Area-based Point In Triangle location discovery scheme (APIT)

APIT employs a novel area-based approach to perform location estimation by isolating
the environment into triangular regions between beacon nodes, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Nodes inside or outside of these triangular regions allow a node to narrow down the area
in which it can potentially reside. By utilizing combinations of beacon nodes positions,
the diameter of the estimated area where a node resides can be reduced to provide good
location estimation [18].
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Figure 3..3: APIT location discovery scheme [18].
The theoretical method used to narrow down the possible area in which a target
node resides is called the Point
Point-In-Triangulation
Triangulation test (PIT). In this test, a node chooses
three location references and tests whether it is inside the triangle formed by connecting
connec
these three references. APIT repeats this PIT test with different location references
combinations until all combinations are exhausted or the required accuracy is achieved.
At this point, APIT calculates the Center of Gravity (COG) of the intersection
intersectio of all the
triangles in which a node resides to determine its estimated position [18].
The APIT algorithm can be broken down into four steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Beacon exchange
PIT testing
APIT aggregation
COG calculation

These steps are performed at individual sensor nodes in a purely distributed fashion.
The pseudo code for APIT algorithm is described below:
− Receive location reference
references (Xi, Yi) from N beacon nodes.
− InsideSet = ϕ // the set of triangles in which the sensor resides
− For (each triangle Ti

triangles) {

o If (Point-In-Triangulation
Triangulation test (Ti) == true)
InsideSet = InsideSet {Ti};
o If (accuracy(InsideSet) > enough)
Break;
},
/* Center of gravity (CoG
CoG) calculation */
− Estimated Position = CoG ( Ti InsideSet);
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The size of InsideSet is noticeably growing cubically with the number of location
references received. For example, with 30 location references in a sensor network of
1500 sensor nodes, the radio region will be divided by 4060 triangles into small pieces. If
the PIT tests render correct inside/outside decisions, each decision will narrow down the
area in which a target node can possibly reside, making the final error small [18].
3.2.2

Creating triangles from location references

The major issue in developing a secure range-free location discovery scheme, which
combines the security features of voting-based scheme [8, 9] and range-free estimation of
APIT [18], is how to generate the triangle areas that will divide the deployment field into
small regions. The regions that represent the highest intersection of those triangular areas
will contain the estimated location of the sensor node.
In APIT, a triangle is formed by any three location references chosen at random.
The sensor node exhausts all the possible combinations of triangles formed by the
location references that it received until it can find a combination of triangles that gives a
maximum intersectional region [18]. This process is very slow and might not provide the
best accuracy required in the estimated location. Also, it does not verify the credibility of
the location references in regard to whether they are legitimate or compromised.
In range-free location discovery, the sensor node has no distance or direction
measurements between itself and the location references that it receives; therefore, the
sensor cannot predict inside which triangle it resides. Instead, the sensor node can have a
rough estimation of its location with respect to the location references using the number
of hops and radio transmission range. Figure 3.4, shows the method developed in this
thesis to create triangular regions that contain the estimated location of the senor node.
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Figure 3.4: Triangle creation method.
The sensor node picks the location reference with the minimum number of hops
(the closest reference to this sensor)
sensor), point P in this example, and uses this location
reference as a guide point to direct the triangles toward it. Each location reference
represents a triangle vertex,, point A in this example,, and the base of the triangle will be
directed towards the guide point, as shown in Figure 3.4. The triangle vertices can be
defined using simple geometry and trigonometric functions as described in the equations
below:
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To increase the accuracy of estimated location of the sensor node, the triangle
includes a smaller inner triangle that shares the same vertex defined by the location
reference point. This provides the same effect as candidate rings in the enhanced votingvoting
based scheme. As a result, the region at which the sensor node is most likely to reside is:
Outer Triangle – Inner Triangle. The inner triangle vertices can be defined using the
following equations:

3.2.3

Point-In-Triangulation
Triangulation test

There are several mathematical algorithms and equations that can check whether a point
resides inside the triangle interior. In this thesis, the Barycentric Coordinates algorithm
[19] was chosen. Barycentric coordinates are triples of numbers (t1, t2, t3) corresponding
to masses placed at the vertices of a reference triangle ∆ABC.. These masses then
determine a point P,, which is the geometric centroid of the three masses and is identified
with coordinates (t1, t2, t3),, as shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5: Barycentric coordinates [19].
triangle define a plane in space,, as shown in Figure 3.6.
Let the three points of the triang
One of the points is chosen such that we all other locations on the plane can be
considered as relative to that point. Next, basis vectors are needed to give coordinate
values to all the locations on the plane. The
he two edges of the triangle that touch A: (C−A)
20

and (B−A) are selected. Any
ny point on the plane can now be reached by starting at A
walking some distance along (C−A) and from that point walking further in the direction
(B−A) [15].

Figure 3.6: Point in Triangle test [15].
With that in mind, we can des
describe any point on the plane as:

According to the above equation, point P can be inside the triangle ABC if and only
if: u, v > 0, and u + v 1.
Given the coordinates of point P, we can calculate u and v using the equation above
to check whether the point P resides inside the triangle or not, as shown below [15]:

Having two unknown variables u and v,, we need two equations to solve for them:

Solving forr those two equations:

Where:
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The point in triangle test can easily be programmed using the following pseudo code
[15]:
− // Compute vectors
w0 = (C−A)
w1 = (B−A)
w2 = (P−A)
− // Compute dot products
dot00 = dot(w0, w0)
dot01 = dot(w0, w1)
dot02 = dot(w0, w2)
dot11 = dot(w1, w1)
dot12 = dot(w1, w2)
− // Compute barycentric coordinates
invDenom = 1 / (dot00 × dot11 − dot01 × dot01)
u = (dot11 × dot02 − dot01 × dot12) × invDenom
v = (dot00 × dot12 − dot01 × dot02) × invDenom
− // Check if point is in triangle
return (u > 0) && (v > 0) && (u + v < 1)

3.2.4

The proposed secure range-free location discovery algorithm

Putting the triangle creation method and the point in triangle test together, the algorithm
of a secure range-free location discovery is now defined. Using the example shown in
Figure 3.7, the details of how this proposed algorithm works can be explained.
The sensor A receives three location references from sensors: U, V and W which
are approximately one, three and two hops away from sensor A, relatively. The location
references would be used to get the extents of the deployment map for that sensor, so that
it contains all the location references received by the sensor node. Then the deployment
map is quantized into small square cells, where the sensor node initializes the voting state
of those cells to zero.
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Figure 3.7: Proposed secure range
range-free
free location discovery scheme.
The voting process starts by identifying the guide point from the closest reference
location received, in this example it would be point U. For each of the remaining location
references, V and W, the inner and outer triangles would be created using the method
met
described in section 3.2.b. The second step is the voting process of marking the cells that
reside inside the region defined by subtraction of outer triangle from inner triangle (the
shaded area shown in Figure 3.7) and incrementing their vote by 1. This
is is done by
checking if any vertex of the cell is inside the shaded region using the Point-In-Triangle
Point
test described in section 3.2.c.
After the sensor node processes all the location references, it selects the cells with
highest vote, and uses their ge
geometrical
ometrical centroid as the estimated location of the sensor
node (point P’ in our example)
example). The secure range-free
free location discovery scheme can
support iterative refinement as in the original scheme presented in [8, 9]. The cells with
maximum vote will be quantized
uantized further into smaller cells and fed back into the voting
process algorithm again to refine the estimated location results.
The proposed secure range
range-free
free location discovery scheme can be summarized in
the following pseudo code:
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− Receive location references {(X1, Y1, Hops1), (X2, Y2, Hops2), ...};
− Determine the extents of deployment field:
− Lower left corner = min. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the location
reference;
− Upper right corner = max. x-coordinate and y-coordinate values among the
location reference;
− Quantize the deployment field into small square cells;
− Select the location reference with min. hops to be the guide point.
− For each cell in quantized deployment field, initialize the voting value to 0;
− For each location reference (Xi, Yi, Hopsi) {
o set outerTriangle (vertex=(Xi, Yi);
Height=(radioRange × Hopsi);)
o set innerTriangle (vertex=(Xi, Yi);
Side=(radioRange × (Hopsi-1));)
o for each cell in quantized deployment field {
 perform PIT test on cell vertices;
 if (PIT test returns TRUE for outerTriangle && FALSE for innerTriangle)
increment cell vote by 1;
}
}
− highVoteCells = Get the set of cells with highest vote;
− estimatedLocation = Compute the geometrical centroid of highVoteCells;
− return estimatedLocation;
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Chapter 4
IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST RESULTS
This chapter explores the implementation of both enhanced voting-based and secure
range-free schemes on Sun SPOT wireless sensors. The schemes were tested on a
combination of actual SPOT and virtual SPOT sensors using Solarium, the emulation
environment provided by Sun SPOT. Another set of tests that focused on security
resilience under various types of attacks was performed using a simulation program
developed for this purpose.

4.1 Implementation on Sun SPOTs and System Architecture
4.1.1

Overview on Sun SPOT wireless sensors

The Sun SPOT sensor device is a small, wireless, battery powered experimental platform.
It is programmed almost entirely in Java to allow programmers to create projects that
require specialized embedded system development skills. The hardware platform includes
a range of built-in sensors as well as the ability to easily interface to external devices
[16].
A full, free-range Sun SPOT device is built by stacking a Sun SPOT processor
board with a sensor board and battery, all packaged in a plastic housing, as shown in
Figure 4.1. The smaller base-station Sun SPOT consists of only the processor board in a
plastic housing. Each Sun SPOT has a 180MHz 32-bit ARM920T core processor with
512K RAM and 4M Flash. The Sun SPOT processor board has a 2.4GHz radio with an
integrated on-board antenna. The radio is a TI CC2420 and is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant.
There is no operating system used. The Sun SPOT runs a Java Virtual Machine directly
on the hardware. The Sun SPOT uses a fully capable Java ME implementation, named
Squawk which supports both CLDC 1.1 and MIDP 1.0, as well as providing basic OS
functionality. The Java Virtual Machine executes directly out of flash memory. All of the
device drivers are written in Java as well [16].
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Figure 4.1: Sun SPOT sensor [16].
4.1.2

Implementation system architecture

Both the enhanced voting-based
based and secure range
range-free location discovery schemes are
implemented in Java as library classes to be used in Sun SPOT wireless sensors. Each
Sun SPOT runs
ns an application that creates an instance of the secure location discovery
library and sets the type of location discovery scheme to be used in the deployed sensor
network. Figure 4.2 shows a block diagram of the system architecture at each Sun SPOT
sensor.
The Sun SPOT sensor runs three main threads: receiving, transmitting and location
discovery. These three threads run simultaneously as soon as the SPOT sensor is
deployed. The receiving thread is responsible for keeping track of location reference
messages from surrounding sensors and beacon nodes. Once the receiving thread gets a
location reference message, it checks to see if this location reference is already included
in the location reference list. If the location reference has already been received
ived, then it is
simply ignored, otherwise, the receiving thread retrieves the hops count and other routing
information about the source of this location reference from the SPOT routing manager.
manager
The hops count is then attached with the location reference coordinates
oordinates to be added to the
location reference list.
The transmitting thread is responsible for broadcasting the SPOT’s estimated
location to its surrounding neighbors. The location discovery thread creates an instance of
location estimator class, and in
initializes
itializes it with the basic information about the SPOT
sensor (maximum radio range, location discovery scheme, initial quantization resolution).
Once the SPOT sensor has received enough location reference
references,, the location discovery
thread triggers the location
on discovery process and blocks both receiving and transmitting
threads until the location is estimated.
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Figure 4.
4.2: System architecture block diagram.
The secure location discovery library contains the necessary classes to perform
either enhanced voting-based
based scheme, or range
range-free
free scheme. The main class in the library
is the locationEstimator class which handles all the interfaces with the upper layer of
threads.It also manages the location references, quantization of the deployment field map
and cells vote generation. When a Sun SPOT creates an instance of the locationEstimator
class it is initialized with the SPOT’s radio coverage range, initial quantization resolution,
resolution
and the type of location discovery scheme to be used to estimate the SPOT’s location.
The locationEstimator class receive
receives location reference from the receiving thread
and stores those location references in the Location Reference List. When the
locationEstimator
Estimator receives enough location references ((three or more reference since a
minimum of three points are required to build a triangle), it sends a ready signal to the
location discovery thread. The location discovery thread returns a request to the
locationEstimator
ionEstimator to initiate a location discovery process. The location discovery process
starts by calculating the extent of the SPOT deployment field based on the received
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location references. The deployment field map is then quantized into a set of cells, each
with a zero vote value. The locationEstimator passes the list of location references and
cells set to the location discovery scheme specified by the Sun SPOT. The location
discovery scheme generates the votes on the cells set and returns the set to the
locationEstimator, which in turn extracts the cells with maximum votes value and
calculate the geometrical centroid (center of gravity for a mass) of those cells to be the
estimated location.
Iterative refinement is performed by the locationEsitmator to increase the accuracy
of the estimated location. This is done by quantizing the set of cells with maximum votes
further into smaller sub-cells and feeding the new sub-cells back to the location discovery
scheme for votes’ generation. The process continues until the difference between two
consecutive estimated locations are less than 5%. At this point, the locationEstimator
returns the estimated location to the location discovery thread to be broadcasted by the
transmitting thread.

4.2 Test Cases and Simulation Results
This thesis presents two sets of test cases. The first is implemented on Sun SPOTs
wireless sensors to check the location discovery schemes accuracy and behavior. The
second test case is implemented on a simulation program to investigate the security
resilience of the location discovery schemes to various degrees of node compromise and
location discovery threats.
4.2.1

Test on Sun SPOTs and Solarium

The first experiment is to test the accuracy of the estimated location of both the enhanced
voting-based scheme and the secure range-free scheme by comparing the distance error
between the sensors’ actual location and their estimated location. The test was performed
on Sun SPOT wireless sensors using the Solarium emulator. Solarium is a Java™
application that can be used to remotely manage a network of Sun SPOTs. With
Solarium, SPOTs can be discovered and the life-cycle of the applications running on
those devices can be managed [17].
Solarium includes an emulator capable of running a Sun SPOT application on a
desktop computer. This allows for testing a program before deploying it to a real SPOT,
or if a real SPOT is not available. Instead of a physical sensor-board, virtual SPOTs have
a sensor panel that is used to set any of the potential sensor inputs (e.g. light level,
temperature, digital pin inputs, analog input voltages, and accelerometer values). The
application controls the resources available in the virtual SPOT, just as in a real SPOT.
28

Receiving and sending via the radio is also supported
supported.. Each virtual SPOT is assigned its
own address and can broadcast or unicast to the other virtual SPOTs. If a shared
basestation is available, a virtual SPOT can also interact over radio with real SPOTs [17].
When a virtual SPOT is created in Solarium, a new process is started to run the
emulator code in a Squawk Virtual Machine (VM).. The emulator code communicates
over a socket connection with the virtual SPOT GUI code in Solarium. For example
when the SPOT application changes the RGB value of an LED
LED, that information is passed
to the virtual SPOT GUI code which updates the display for that LED with the new RGB
value. Likewise when the user clicks on one of the virtual SPOT's switches using the
mouse, Solarium sends a message to the emulator code that the switch has been clicked,
which can then be noticed by the SPOT application. Figure 4.3. shows a block diagram
diagr of
the Emulator architecture [17]
[17].

Figure 4.3: Block diagram of emulator architecture in Solarium [17].
[17]
Each virtual SPOT has its own Squawk VM running in a separate process on the
host computer. Each Squawk VM also contains a complete host-side
side radio stack as part
of the SPOT library. This allows the SPOT application to communicate with other SPOT
applications running on the host computer, such as other virtual SPOTs, using sockets or
real SPOTs via radio if a shared basestation is running [17].
The experiment was implemented twice, once for each location discovery scheme,
on a network of 9 virtual SPOTs, 3 of those SPOTs were beacon nodes and the
th rest were
sensor nodes, as shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Sun SPOTs experiment snapshot.
The experiment
xperiment starts with the beacon nodes broadcasting their locations to the
other sensor nodes. Each sensor node receives location references from its neighbors
nei
and
estimates its location accordingly
accordingly. It then broadcasts the estimated location to the
surrounding neighbors. After several rounds of exchanging location references and
modifying the estimated location
location, each sensor node reaches a stabilized state where the
changes in estimated
mated locations are very small.
The results recorded for the Sun SPOT sensors, as shown in table 4.1,, show that the
estimated locations for both enhanced voting
voting-based and secure range-free
free schemes were
very closee to the actual locations of their perspective sensor nodes. Figure 4.5 shows the
Sun SPOTs layout map along with estimated location for each SPOT sensor.
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Beacon Node
Location

A
16.5, 42

B
49.5, 36

C
40.5, 9

1

2

3

4

5

Actual Location

25.5, 36

40.5, 33

31.5, 27

20.5, 23

31.5, 15

Enhanced
Voting-Based

36.35
26.14, 36.3

40.66, 29.91

30.42, 24.75

20.19, 21.62

32.86, 13.31

Secure
Range-Free

26.14, 36.04

40.7, 30.55

33.6, 29.88

24.4, 22.8

32.58, 15.81

Enhanced
Voting-Based

0.733

3.09

2.5

1.41

2.17

Secure
Range-Free

0.644

2.46

3.57

3.91

1.35

Error
Distance

Estimated
Location

Sensor Node

Table 4.1: Sun SPOTs experiment results.

Figure 4.5: Sun SPOTs experiment layout map and results.
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4.2.2

Simulation test and results

In order to test the security resilience of the proposed secure location discovery schemes,
a test program was developed in Java to simulate a network of wireless sensor nodes
subjected to various levels of security attacks. The test program contains three classes:
Simulator, SensorNode, and Media, as shown in Figure 4.6. The Simulator class is the
main class which is responsible for initializing the simulated sensor network and applying
various security threats to that network while running the simulation. The SensorNode
class represents a simulated sensor node which has an instance of the secure location
discovery library (similar to a Sun SPOT sensor as described in section 4.1.b) and uses
that library to initiate a location discovery process to estimate its location. The Media
class represents the deployment field at which the simulated sensor network is operating.
It contains three lists: beaconNodes, sensorNodes and compromisedNodes. Each list
contains the sensor node actual location (as generated by the Simulation class) and its
estimated location (as generated by the SensorNode class).

Figure 4.6: Simulator class diagram.
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A test case starts by entering the parameters required by the Simulator class to
simulate the sensor network. These parameters include the deployment field area, size of
the simulated sensor network, number of beacon nodes in the simulated network, the
radio coverage range for each sensor, maximum number of simulation rounds (so as not
to run into infinite loops) and maximum acceptable error distance between a sensor node
actual location and its estimated location. The Simulator class uses these parameters to
generate and initialize the simulated sensor network, and then generates the location of
each sensor randomly to fit within the simulation deployment field. Each simulated node
is added to the Media class: beacon nodes are added to the beaconNodes list with their
actual locations (as generated by the Simulator class) and sensor nodes are added to the
sensorNodes list with their actual locations and setting the corresponding estimated
locations to null value.
The simulation starts with no security threats (0% node compromise) and each
simulated sensor initiates a first round of location discovery using enhanced voting-based
scheme. The simulated sensors check their surrounding neighbors for location references
and estimate their locations accordingly and store the results in the corresponding
position in the sensorNodes list. After all the sensors finish estimating their locations, the
average error distance and mean execution time are calculated for this round. The sensor
nodes continue more rounds of location discovery to further increase the accuracy of their
estimated locations until the average error distance becomes less than or equal to the
maximum acceptable error distance for all the sensors in the network, or the number of
simulation rounds reaches the maximum number of rounds.
At this point, the Simulator class resets the simulation network back to its initial
state and begins the simulation process again for 0% node compromise, but this time
using secure range-free scheme for location discovery. This process is repeated for 10%,
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% nodes compromise, and all the results of average error distance
and average execution time are being recorded for each step.
The security threats are simulated through the Simulator class by choosing a
number of sensors at random to act as malicious nodes. The number of those malicious
nodes is specified by the attack percentage of node compromise. The attack pattern is a
combination of compromised beacon nodes attack, reply attack and masquerade attack.
The compromised beacon nodes attack is achieved by randomly removing some beacon
nodes from the beaconNodes list and putting them into the compromisedNodes list where
each compromised beacon node randomly generates a malicious location other than its
actual location. The reply and masquerade attacks are achieved by randomly removing
some sensor nodes from the sensorNodes list and putting them into the
compromisedNodes list where each malicious sensor node randomly chooses a beacon
node location to report as its own estimated location.
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Five test cases were simulated using the test program for various network scales
(25, 250, 500, 1000 and 1500 sensor nodes) with a maximum acceptable error distance of
1 unit distance, as shown in table 4.2. Each network size implements both the enhanced
voting-based and secure range-free location discovery schemes. Both schemes were
subjected to different levels of security threats and attacks, starting from 0% node
compromise, up to 50% node compromise in intervals of 10%. The results of those five
test cases were recorded as shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8.
Network
Size

Deployment
Field Area

Number of
Beacon
Nodes

Radio Coverage
Range for each
Sensor Node

Max. Number of
Simulation
Rounds

Max.
Acceptable
Error Distance

25

5×5

5

3

10

1

250

25 × 10

50

3

10

1

500

25 × 20

100

3

10

1

1000

50 × 20

200

3

10

1

1500

50 × 30

300

3

10

1

Table 4.2: Simulation tests parameters.
The simulation results, as shown in Figure 4.7, show that as the network size
increases, the security resilience improves. This is clearly shown by the percentage of
sensors that failed to estimate their location within the acceptable error distance
tolerance. This percentage drops as the network size increases. This is due to the location
references for each sensor node in the network increasing as the network size grows; this
increases the accuracy of the estimated location for each sensor and provides more
benign location references to withstand malicious references at various levels of attacks.
Comparing the results of enhanced voting-based scheme with secure range-free
scheme, as shown in Figure 4.7, the enhanced voting-based scheme is more resilient than
the secure range-free scheme. The percentage of sensor nodes that were unable to
estimate their locations within the acceptable error distance tolerance using enhanced
voting-based scheme were less than the percentage of sensor nodes unable to estimate
their locations using secure range-free scheme. This is because in the secure range-free
scheme each sensor node relies on its direct neighbors to be the guide points to estimate
its location accurately. When some of those guide points are compromised, the accuracy
decreases and the sensor node becomes more vulnerable to security attacks. Never the
less, the resilience of secure range-free scheme was still good enough to withhold a
security threat of 50% node compromise, as shown in Figure 4.7(b).
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(b) Secure Range-Free Scheme
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Figure 4.7: Security resilience simulation test results.
Figure 4.8 shows the average location discovery execution time. The enhanced
voting-based scheme runs faster than the secure range-free scheme. This is because in
secure range-free scheme, each sensor constructs a triangle from a received location
reference towards every guide point, thus making the execution time a O(n×m), where n
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Location Discovery Execution Time (msec)

is the number of location references and m is the number of guide points around the
sensor node. Therefore, as the number of guide points increase the execution time
increases as well. This is an important factor in increasing the accuracy of location
discovery in the secure range-free scheme.

250
200
150
Enhanced VotingBased

100

Secure Range-Free
50
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

% of node compromise and location discovery attack

Figure 4.8: Location discovery execution time.
In order to optimize the execution time for secure range-free scheme, a comparison
experiment was made on two networks of size 250 sensors. One network with the number
of guide points for each sensor reduced to one guide point (picked randomly), and the
other network has the number of guide points for each sensor set to maximum. The
results of this experiment show improvement over execution time for the first network,
where the time becomes an O(m), as shown in Figure 4.9(b). Despite the improvement in
execution time, a drawback in the security resilience for the first network occurs as
shown in Figure 4.9(a). As the number of guide points decreases for a sensor node, in the
case of an attack scenario, the probability of having malicious guide points increases.
This makes the location discovery process more vulnerable.
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Figure 4.9: Comparison test results.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, two location discovery schemes for wireless sensor networks are
developed. The first scheme is an enhanced version of the voting based scheme
developed in [8, 9] to be used for range-based location discovery. This enhanced scheme
is used to inspire the development of a secure range-free location discovery scheme. The
secure range-free scheme is tested and compared to the enhanced voting-based scheme in
both field and simulation tests. Both schemes are implemented on Sun SPOT wireless
sensors and tested for location discovery accuracy, giving good results in terms of
estimated locations for each deployed SPOT sensor.
Simulation results show that both enhanced voting-based and secure range-free
schemes are able to withstand security threats and location discovery attacks up to 50%
of node compromise. Enhanced voting-based scheme showed resilience and accuracy
under attack patterns more frequently than the secure range-free scheme. This is an
inherited feature from range-based location discovery schemes. Range-free schemes tend
to be less accurate than range-based schemes, yet more cost-effective [18]. The
simulation results also show that optimizing the execution time for secure range-free
scheme will affect its security resilience as well as location estimation accuracy.
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